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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Justin Robert Wicklund appeals from the judgment entered upon the 
district court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings 1 
Wicklund held a gun to his ex-girlfriend, [S.R.'s], head, held her down, and 
raped her. (#38697 PSI, p.2.) S.R. suffered a vaginal tear and bruising to her 
legs, arms, shoulders, and chest. (#38697 PSI, p.2; 3/18/11 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-6.) 
The state charged Wicklund with rape, aggravated assault, and domestic 
violence. (See Plea Agreement (augmentation).) Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
the state amended the rape charge to aggravated battery and dismissed the 
domestic violence charge and Wicklund pied guilty to aggravated battery and 
aggravated assault. (See id.; Guilty Plea Advisory Form (augmentation); 
1/3/2011 Tr.) The district court imposed consecutive unified sentences of 12 
years with two years fixed for aggravated battery, and five years with two years 
fixed for aggravated assault. (Judgment of Conviction (augmentation).) 
Wicklund filed a Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district 
court denied. (Order on I.C.R. 35 Motion (augmentation).) 
1 Pursuant to Wicklund's motion, the Court entered an order augmenting the 
record with certain documents from Wicklund's underlying criminal case and 
taking judicial notice of the transcripts and presentence investigation report from 
Wicklund's direct appeal in Docket No. 38697. (Order Granting Motion 
Requesting That The Court Take Judicial Notice And Motion To Augment The 
Record, dated May 16, 2013.) All transcript references will be based on the date 
of the hearing. 
1 
Course Of Post-Conviction Proceedings2 
Wicklund filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming, among other 
things, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., pp.5-11.) With 
respect to counsel, Wicklund alleged his attorney (1) "only came to county jail to 
see [him] eather [sic] the day befor [sic] court or in court"; (2) "told [him he] would 
not win" at trial "and said he got [him] the best deal he could"; (3) took advantage 
of his mental illness; (4) coerced him into pleading guilty; (5) "rail roaded [sic] 
[him] with a [rape] case from 2009 that was dismissed that he belived [sic] to be 
the same case"; and (6) "never challenged anything." (R., pp.8-9.) Wicklund 
also filed a motion for the appointment of counsel, which the district court 
granted. (R., pp.17-21.) 
The court filed a notice of intent to dismiss "portions" of Wicklund's 
petition and the state filed a motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp.30-43, 77-
88.) The court ultimately dismissed all of Wicklund's claims with the exception of 
the claim that counsel was ineffective in relation to his investigation of the "2009 
charge," which was considered by the court at sentencing. (R., pp.41-42, 90-91.) 
The court, however, denied relief on that claim following an evidentiary hearing. 
(R., pp.101-109.) Wicklund timely appealed from the Judgment dismissing his 
petition. (R., pp.111-114.) Wicklund also filed a motion to reconsider, which the 
district court denied. (R., pp.116-125, 131.) 
2 A different judge presided over Wicklund's post-conviction case than the judge 
who imposed sentence and entered judgment in his underlying criminal case. 
(Compare 3/18/2011 Tr. with 7/23/2012 Tr.) 
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ISSUE 
Wicklund states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Wicklund's 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Wicklund failed to show the district court in denying post-conviction 
relief on his claim that counsel was ineffective in representing him at sentencing? 
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ARGUMENT 
Wicklund Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
Following an evidentiary hearing on Wicklund's claim that counsel 
provided ineffective assistance at sentencing, the court entered a Memorandum 
Opinion denying relief, concluding Wicklund failed to establish either deficient 
performance or prejudice. (R., pp.101-109.) Review and application of the 
relevant legal standards and the evidence presented shows Wicklund has failed 
to establish the district court erred in dismissing his petition. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents mixed questions of 
law and fact. A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which her claim is based. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 57(c); Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135, 
141 (1986). A trial court's decision that the petitioner has not met his burden of 
proof is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 
964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990). Further, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight 
to be given to the testimony are matters within the discretion of the trial court. 
Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 644 P.2d 1333 (1982). 
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C. Wicklund Failed To Prove. By A Preponderance Of The Evidence. That 
His Attorney Was Ineffective At Sentencing 
The evidentiary hearing held in Wicklund's case was limited to whether 
trial counsel was "ineffective with regard to dealing with the prior record claim 
and whether that affected [the judge's] sentencing decision." (7/3/2012 Tr., p.13, 
Ls.2-6.) In order to prove his counsel was ineffective, Wicklund was required to 
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 
137, 77 4 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). With respect to the deficient performance prong, 
the United States Supreme Court has articulated the defendant's burden under 
Strickland as follows: 
To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a 
conviction must show that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. A court considering a claim 
of ineffective assistance must apply a strong presumption that 
counsel's representation was within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance. The challenger's burden is to show that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (citations and quotations 
omitted). Further, counsel's actions are to be evaluated at the time they were 
undertaken, not with twenty-twenty hindsight. See Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 790 
("After an adverse verdict at trial even the most experienced counsel may find it 
difficult to resist asking whether a different strategy might have been better, and, 
in the course of that reflection, to magnify their own responsibility for an 
unfavorable outcome. Strickland, however, calls for an inquiry into the objective 
reasonableness of counsel's performance, not counsel's subjective state of 
5 
mind."); State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 345, 127 P.3d 954, 961 (2005) 
(citations and quotations omitted) ("In assessing the reasonableness of attorney 
performance, this Court has cautioned, judicial scrutiny must be highly 
deferential and every effort must 'be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and 
to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time."). Murphy v. 
State, 143 Idaho 139, 147, 139 P.3d 741, 749 (Ct. App. 2006) ("While trial 
counsel's candor is commendable, we assess his conduct by way of an objective 
review of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms so as to eliminate 
the distorting effects of hindsight.") 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 787. "A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." kl (citations 
and quotations omitted). "It is not enough to show that the errors had some 
conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding." kl Rather, "[c]ounsel's 
errors must be so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable." kl 
At the outset of the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Wicklund 
submitted three exhibits: (1) a letter from the victim in his underlying 2010 
criminal case (Exhibit 1; see 7/23/12 Tr., p.17, Ls.2-4); (2) an Affidavit in Support 
of Complaint and Warrant of Arrest, filed April 16, 2009, in support of the 2009 
rape charge (hereafter "2009 Affidavit") (Exhibit 2); and (3) the state's Motion to 
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Dismiss the 2009 rape charge and the Order to Dismiss Case No. CR-09-4052 
(Exhibit 3). The 2009 Affidavit was prepared by Detective Todd Rudner and was 
attached to the PSI prepared for Wicklund's 2010 criminal case. (Exhibit 2, p.1; 
#40269 PSI, pp.15-20.) In the affidavit, Detective Rudner detailed his 
involvement in a rape case involving Wicklund and M.B. (See generally Exhibit 
2.) The affidavit included the following information regarding the alleged rape: 
Detective Greg Lockwood with the Twin Falls Police Department, 
assisted. Det. Lockwood responded to the Saint Lukes Magic 
Valley Regional Medical Center, to speak with the victim, [M.B.], 
and the witness Miller. Det. Lockwood met with Miller, who said 
her and [M.B.] were drinking at Woody's when Wicklund 
approached them. Miller said Wicklund was hitting on her by 
kissing on her neck. She said when she showed no interest, he 
then started talking to [M.B.] Miller said she left to use the 
restroom, when she returned [M.B.] and Wicklund were gone. 
Miller said she checked other areas of the Bar and other bars in the 
area before returning to Woody's, where she saw [M.B.] and 
Wicklund return inside. Miller said [M.B.] ran up to her and wanted 
to leave. Miller said [M.B.] told her that Wicklund forced her into his 
pickup truck, with a Topper and carpet inside, parked in the parking 
lot. [M.B.] told Miller that she screamed for help, as Wicklund 
penetrated her. Det. Lockwood spoke with [M.B.] who was 
coherent enough to orate her feeling. [M.B.] said she had been 
raped, and she had told Wicklund to stop several times. [M.B.] 
said she did not begin bleeding until she was penetrated. [M.B.] 
did not know Wicklund's name, nor had she seen him before. 
There was a significant amount of blood in the room. Det. 
Lockwood was informed that [M.B.] had a [sic] incision inside her 
vaganal [sic], that was causing significant blood loss. [M.B.] was 
going in and out of consciousness, and was being prepared for 
surgery. 
(Exhibit 2, pp.2-3 (punctuation original).) 
The 2009 Affidavit also provided details of law enforcement's investigation 
of Wicklund. (Exhibit 2, pp.3-4.) That investigation included locating Wicklund's 
truck, which matched the description provided, a search of which revealed blood 
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stains on the carpet in the back. (Exhibit 2, p.3.) When interviewed, Wicklund 
admitted having "intercourse with a person matching [M.B.'s] description" and 
admitted she told him to "stop" although he "later changed his story to say that 
he stopped when [M.B.] said 'it hurts."' (Exhibit 2, p.4.) Wicklund also advised 
law enforcement where he left his condom and said that he "tore his underwear 
off and threw them on the ground." (Exhibit 2, p.4.) Law enforcement recovered 
both the "used and full condom in the proximity of where Wicklund stated he 
discarded the one he used" and "a torn pair of underpants (blue) in the same 
area matching the description that Wicklund gave." (Exhibit 2, p.4.) Finally, the 
2009 Affidavit also revealed that Wicklund said "he had a history of violence and 
was taking medications for his numerous anger management issues" and that 
"he had made a mistake and was going to pay for what he had done." (Exhibit 2, 
p.4.) 
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Wicklund presented the 
testimony of two witnesses - himself and attorney Joseph Rockstahl. Mr. 
Rocksthal testified that he represented Wicklund in Case No. CR-2009-4052, in 
which Wicklund was charged with rape. (7/23/2012 Tr., p.11, Ls.21-25.) That 
charge was ultimately dismissed pursuant to the state's motion because, 
according to Mr. Rockstahl, "the witness was not credible" and "[t]he evidence 
didn't support her story." (7/23/2012 Tr., p.12, L.3 - p.13, L.6; Exhibit 3.) Mr. 
Rockstahl also testified that, in his professional opinion, it would be a defense 
attorney's duty in a rape case to "know the facts" from a prior rape case that was 
dismissed to "see if they helped or hurt, and then if they help, you'd want to 
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make the Court aware of it," and the failure to do so would be a breach of that 
duty. (7/23/2012 Tr., p.14, L.19 - p.15, L.15.) On cross-examination, however, 
Mr. Rockstahl acknowledged that he never spoke to the victim in the 2009 case 
and that the information he had regarding the "credibility" of the victim did not 
come from the prosecutor's office. (7/23/2012 Tr., p.17, L.8-p.19, L.11.) 
Wicklund also testified at the hearing. (7/23/2012 Tr., p.20, L.7 - p.26, 
L.25.) When asked what "specifically" he would have had counsel present to the 
court at sentencing, Wicklund responded: "I would have him worked harder on 
trying to strike the 2009 affidavit" written by Officer Rudner regarding "the prior 
rape charges that was [sic] dismissed." (7/23/2012 Tr., p.21, Ls.12-20.) 
Wicklund testified that he asked counsel to "strike it or argue to the Court about 
that affidavit" but denied ever talking to counsel about "the circumstances around 
why that 2009 criminal case was dismissed." (7/23/2012 Tr., p.21, L.21 - p.23, 
L.2.) Wicklund claimed he failed to do so because he "only knew that it was 
dismissed" but "didn't know why it was." (7/23/2012 Tr., p.23, Ls.6-7, 20-22.) 
Wicklund, however, acknowledged that counsel did in fact move to strike the 
affidavit but the court denied his request. (7/23/2012 Tr., p.26, Ls.4-25.) 
The district court denied relief on Wicklund's claim that counsel was 
ineffective at sentencing, articulating several reasons for doing so. First, the 
court noted Wicklund failed to provide any evidence of what efforts, if any, trial 
counsel made in investigating the reason for the dismissal of the 2009 charge. 
(R., pp.105-106.) And Wicklund admitted he provided no information to counsel 
as to the reason for the dismissal. (7/23/2012 Tr., p.21, L.21 - p.23, L.22.) 
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Thus, what trial counsel "'did' or 'didn't do' to investigate the circumstances of the 
2009 case" was "purely speculative" and Wicklund failed to "develop the record 
in these regards." (R., pp.105-106.) 
Second, the court found that trial counsel was "clearly aware" of the 2009 
case and "the potential damage" that case could have on Wicklund's sentence in 
the 2010 case. (R., p.106.) Based on this awareness, counsel noted the 2009 
case had been dismissed and asked the court to "strike" the 2009 Affidavit from 
the PSI. (3/18/2011 Tr., p.4, Ls.17-19.) The court denied the request, stating: 
"The court has reviewed that. I believe that I can in careful circumstance [sic] 
consider information from uncharged or dismissed cases. I understand the case 
law surrounding that. I will not strike it and give it the due weight to which I deem 
it entitled in this case." (3/18/2011 Tr., p.4, L.22 - p.5, L.2.) Prior to imposing 
sentence, the court again addressed counsel's request to have the affidavit 
stricken, stating: 
Let me note first, just the issue, of the affidavit that is 
appended to the presentence report again, I've previously ruled 
that I wouldn't strike it from the PSI. The court indicates in several 
cases, including State vs. Wickel, and State vs. Stewart, Wickel is 
found at 126 Idaho 578, Stewart is at 122 Idaho 284, that a 
sentencing court may consider a myriad of factors in imposing a 
sentence. The broad spectrum includes a defendant's past 
criminal history and with due caution the existence of a defendant's 
alleged criminal activity for which no charges have been filed or 
where charges have been dismissed. A trial court in determining 
the sentence to be imposed may consider prior dismissed charges 
or charges currently pending against a defendant. That's quoting 
Stewart. 
I've considered that legal standard as I reviewed the 
affidavit from Officer Rudner filed April 16, '09. I recognize 
that case was dismissed and so it is with due caution that I 
review the facts set forth in the affidavit, but I take away from 
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the affidavit with my due caution, a concern that it was a 
similar type situation. 
(3/18/2011 Tr., p.22, L.18 - p.23, L.7 (emphasis added).) Thus, counsel did 
attempt to have the 2009 Affidavit stricken, but that request was denied. 
Third, Wicklund failed to present any evidence at the evidentiary hearing 
that trial counsel could have provided to the court that would "mitigate the effect 
of the information presented in the affidavit." (R., p.106.) As explained by the 
district court: 
Wicklund's argument presupposes that [trial counsel] either had 
evidence to contradict the contents of the affidavit or that he could 
have made some additional argument to challenge the effect of the 
affidavit. It is incumbent upon Wicklund in this post-conviction 
proceeding to come forward with evidence or perhaps argument 
that could and should have been presented by trial counsel []. In 
the absence of such information, Wicklund has not carried his 
burden of proof in this case to show either ineffective assistance of 
counsel [sic] or prejudice as a result. In this case, Wicklund has 
presented evidence through attorney Rockstahl as to his opinion 
why the state dismissed the 2009 case. What was not presented 
at the evidentiary hearing was any evidence that [trial counsel] 
should have been aware of something else to contradict the 
contents of the affidavit. That affidavit clearly contains statements 
from [M.B.] describing the violent nature of Wicklund's sexual 
advances, which Judge Bevan considered in his sentencing 
remarks. The issue then, is whether any evidence existed that [trial 
counsel] could or should have presented in order to mitigate those 
accusations to Judge Bevan. If no such evidence existed, then 
[trial counsel] was not objectively ineffective [sic3] for failing to 
produce it. Wicklund has failed to show that any such evidence 
was obtainable. 
(R., pp.106-107 (emphasis original).) 
3 The state assumes by "ineffective" the court meant "deficient" since ineffective 
assistance of counsel requires a showing of both deficient performance and 
prejudice. 
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Finally, the district court also concluded Wicklund failed to establish 
prejudice. (R., pp.108-109.) 
Wicklund claims the district court's decision to deny relief was erroneous, 
arguing Mr. Rockstahl's testimony "proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that his attorney's performance in failing to investigate the prior charge and/or 
failing to present it to the district court was objectively unreasonable, satisfying 
the first prong of the Strickland analysis." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) However, as 
noted by the district court, Rockstahl's impressions about why the 2009 case 
was dismissed were inadequate to meet Wicklund's burden. This is particularly 
true given Rockstahl's concessions on cross-examination that he never actually 
spoke to the victim and the information he had regarding the "credibility" of the 
victim did not come from the prosecutor's office. (7/23/2012 Tr., p.17, L.8 -
p.19, L.11.) As noted by the district court: 
There are any number of reasons why the State may not 
have pursued the rape case against Wicklund. Mr. Rockstahl's 
opinions of those reasons are pure conjecture insofar as the 
State's actual reasons are concerned. The fact that the State did 
not pursue a rape case does not mean that the factual assertions 
made by [M.B.] are not true. 
(R., p.108.) Wicklund had the opportunity to present evidence regarding the 
actual reason for the state's decision to dismiss, versus Rockstahl's speculation 
about that decision, but failed to do so. 
Moreover, Rockstahl's speculation about the reason for dismissal in no 
way informs whether trial counsel was deficient in failing to argue at sentencing 
that the court should strike the affidavit because the victim was not credible. 
Wicklund contends, "If trial counsel did not know about the reasons behind the 
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dismissal of the 2009 case, he failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of 
material that the prosecution will probably rely on." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) The 
flaw in Wicklund's argument is the very first word - "If." Wicklund has no idea 
what counsel "'did' or 'didn't do"' because he never called him as a witness at the 
evidentiary hearing. (R., p.105.) The point of the evidentiary hearing is to 
present evidence about what counsel investigated, or did not investigate, and the 
reasons underlying those decisions; it is not to present evidence about what 
others think counsel should have done and then speculate about why counsel 
did not conform to their expectations. 
Wicklund's next argument is based on another "if" - "if trial counsel knew 
about the reasons behind the dismissal of the 2009 case, he failed to present 
that mitigating evidence to the district court, which constitutes objectively 
unreasonable performance." (Appellant' Brief, p.11.) In addition to the "if' flaw in 
this argument, it also fails because it presupposes "the reasons behind the 
dismissal of the 2009 case" as being the same as Rockstahl's "impressions" of 
why the case was dismissed - a proposition the district court rejected. (R., 
p.107.) Even assuming counsel "knew" or believed, as Rockstahl did, that the 
2009 case was dismissed because of "credibility" concerns about the victim, it 
would not be objectively unreasonable for him to make a strategic decision not to 
argue as much to the district court. It is difficult to imagine any such argument 
would change the court's view of the allegations in the 2009 Affidavit in any 
positive way. If anything, such an argument could undermine counsel's and 
Wicklund's claims that he accepts responsibility for his actions. (3/18/2011 Tr., 
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p.17, Ls.2-5, p.21, Ls.5-9.) Such an argument would also likely be viewed as 
inconsistent with Wicklund's own admissions in relation to the 2009 case. 
Further, even if there were concerns about M.B.'s "credibility"4 that resulted in 
dismissal of the case, Wicklund's best version of events was that he stopped 
having sex with M.B. because she said "it hurts" and, even though he later 
claimed it was consensual, at the time he admitted he "had a history of violence 
and was taking medications for his numerous anger management issues" and 
said he "had made a mistake and was going to pay for what he had done." 
(Exhibit 2, p.4.) The district court correctly concluded Wicklund failed to meet his 
burden of proving counsel was deficient in his efforts to strike or mitigate the 
2009 Affidavit. 
With respect to prejudice, Wicklund argues, "The preponderance of the 
evidence also shows the greater probability that trial counsel's unreasonable 
performance prejudiced Mr. Wicklund." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) In support of 
4 According to Rockstahl, Wicklund's defense was that it was "consensual" and 
"the witness was not credible" because "[t]he evidence didn't support her story." 
(7/23/2012 Tr., p.12, Ls.17-18, p.13, Ls.2-4.) Rockstahl also testified it was his 
"impression" that the case was dismissed because the victim was not credible, 
they "had witnesses who contradicted everything she claimed," "she came 
across as mentally unstable for the most part," "she was taking blood thinners 
and drinking alcohol heavily," the "reason" for the vaginal tear was that Wicklund 
"has a very large penis," and she lied about the incident because she was afraid 
her boyfriend, who was "either a gang member and/or a drug dealer," would find 
out she had sex with Wicklund and "hurt her or have someone hurt her." 
(7/23/2012 Tr., p.16, Ls.9-13, p.17, L.13 -p.19, L.11.) It is worth noting that 
Rockstahl's view of the case is partly contradicted by the 2009 Affidavit -
specifically Miller's statements and Wicklund's own admissions to law 
enforcement. And it is hardly surprising that M.B. may have appeared "mentally 
unstable" after what happened and/or in response to the nature of the defense 
Wicklund intended to present. 
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this argument, Wicklund asserts "the district court explicitly relied on the similarity 
of the allegations from the 2009 case, contained in Officer Rudner's affidavit," 
and its "discussion of the 2009 charge constituted nearly half its total comments 
before imposing sentence." (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12.) Wicklund then 
asserts: "the impact of the district court's misconception regarding the 
underlying charge clearly impacted its consideration of the sentencing factors in 
a detrimental manner .... " (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) Although the Court need 
not address the prejudice prong given Wicklund's failure to meet his burden of 
showing deficient performance, a review of the record shows Wicklund also 
failed to satisfy his burden on the prejudice prong. 
Even if trial counsel would have presented Rockstahl's version of why the 
2009 case was dismissed when the district court sentenced Wicklund in 2010, 
there is not a reasonable probability that the court's sentences would have been 
different. First, the court expressly acknowledged the 2009 case was dismissed; 
accordingly, the court appropriately viewed the allegations in the affidavit with 
"due caution." (3/18/2011 Tr., p.23, Ls.10-12.) Second, the court's comments in 
relation to the 2009 case primarily focused, not on M.B.'s allegations, but on 
Wicklund's own statements. Specifically, the court noted Wicklund's statement 
regarding his history of violence and medication for anger management and 
Wicklund's statements about the actual encounter and the "fact" that M.B. "was 
taken into surgery after an incision inside her vaginal canal which caused 
significant blood loss." (3/18/2011 Tr., p.23, L.15 - p.24, L.10.) "[T]hose facts, 
notwithstanding due caution, are established." (3/18/2011 Tr., p.24, Ls.9-10.) 
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And those facts are established regardless of the reasons the case was 
dismissed. 
The court next noted the similarity of facts between the 2009 case and the 
2010 case that was before the court for sentencing. (3/18/2011 Tr., p.26, L.11.) 
The court then commented on the violent nature of the offense before it and the 
results of Wicklund's psychological assessment during which Wicklund 
"indicated that when [he was] drinking, 'he gets in a fight almost every night. 
He's lost jobs over this. He will get angry and leave."' (3/18/2011 Tr., p.24, L.12 
- p.25, L.14.) The court next noted Wicklund had "really done nothing over [his] 
history ... to address significant violence issues that perhaps [he] received a 
pass for on the prior situation, which should [have been] enough to put a man on 
notice that he needs to get help." (3/18/2011 Tr., p.25, Ls.17-21.) Finally, in 
imposing sentencing the court stated: 
So in considering the factors of 19-2521, in my view, 
deterrence of you specifically is a significant consideration. The 
nature of the harm and the violence done is a significant 
consideration, the potential for future risk I find is significant, and 
the potential for societal harm where there have been incidents 
involving similar behavior with two independent people is also 
elevated. 
Also, I find a sentence less than a prison sentence will 
seriously depreciate the seriousness of this kind of behavior and 
that anything less, in my view, discounts the significance of it. I say 
that too in taking into account what I believe to be a lack of 
responsibility or remorse in this case as was recognized by your 
mother in the presentence report. Neither she nor you feel you 
even committed a crime in this case. While we could say that 
perhaps she's misquoting you, those kinds of conclusions certainly 
do not come from thin air. She has said that he and I believe he 
did not commit any crime. 
(3/18/2011 Tr., p.25, L.25- p.26, L.19.) 
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Under the circumstances, there is no reasonable probability that the 
district court would have imposed a different sentence had Wicklund's attorney 
presented an opinion that although the circumstances between the 2009 and 
2010 cases were similar, and despite Wicklund's admissions in relation to the 
2009 case, the 2009 case was dismissed because the victim was not "credible," 
was drinking and taking a blood thinner. The district court correctly concluded 
Wicklund failed to meet his burden of proving either deficient performance or 
prejudice. Wicklund has not demonstrated otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
judgment dismissing Wicklund's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 22nd day of July, 2013. 
Deputy Attorney General 
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